THE ARMY AND THE GENERAL STAFF
The Army of the Third Republic made a number of changes following the humiliation of 1870-1871. Many reforms were a testament to this, including obligatory service for all male citizens, changes in open field maneuvers, the establishment of the Ecole Superieure de Guerre in 1876, and a general reorganization of the Superior War Council and the General Staff. (Bredin, 15) But despite such reorganizations and advancements, there were several problems that were allowed to flourish, including elitism, prejudice, inadequate superior officers, and uncompromising attitudes. All of these factors would allow for the opportunity of the Dreyfus Affair to originate, and at the same time prevent the Affair from coming to a painless end.
The Army’s popularity and conservatism were two of its most strident elements. Georges Sorel, in his Reflexions sur la violence commented that "The clearest and most tangible manifestation of the state that it is possible to have, and the one most firmly attached to its origins, is the army." (de la Gorce, 28) During the last quarter of the 19th century, the Army began to receive increased attention, and with it, increased popularity. It was through these men, the French believed, that revenge over the Germans and the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine would come about. Such respect and adulation would ultimately contribute to the notion that the Army was a sacred entity, even to the point that its infallibility had to be maintained, even if it cost the life of a Jewish officer.
The composition of the Army would play a very important role. For many reasons, the Army was attractive to those with conservative, Catholic backgrounds. One reason was due to the similarities between the Army and the Church. Both were conservative entities, and both believed in hierarchy, duty, and service. In addition, the humiliating German defeat, and the constant reminder of it by the lost provinces served as a rallying call to those anxious to restore France’s former glory. That is why, throughout this period, many who had enrolled in St. Cyr, came from country estates, still staunchly reactionary and for the most part untouched by the ideas of the Revolution. (Chapman, 38) In addition to this longing for military greatness there were also economic reasons. Declining prices in agriculture effected many land proprietors, many of which were conservative, and young men from this sector often sought the Army for financial stability. (de la Gorce, 24)
For the General Staff, conformity seemed to be an obsession. Most, if not all of its members shared the same backgrounds, ideas, and were inspired by the same principles. (de la Gorce, 37) The Law of 1818 prevented membership into the Staff from being drawn from fighting troops, but the defeat in 1871 called for a reorganization of the Staff. New guidelines were set in place so as to prevent a closed circle, inexperienced in warfare from dominating the Staff again, but many previous Staff officers still retained their positions. (Chapman, 43) By 1894, when the revelation of treason came about, the General Staff was still the conservative, predominately Catholic, and hopelessly anti-Semitic entity, it always had been.
The highest ranking position on the General Staff was the Minister of War. Appointed in 1893 by Jean Casimir-Perier, Auguste Mercier’s equanimity with politics and reputation for sound judgment insured his popularity, especially with the new Prime Minister Charles Dupuy. (Lewis, 85-86) But a number of incidents, including the Turpin Scandal, and a mishandling of 60,000 conscriptions put the otherwise successful War Minister on edge. When news of the bordereau reached him, he was, needless to say, anxious to find the guilty party, for he knew all to well, that such a case could either make or break his reputation. He also began to be criticized constantly by the anti-Semitic newspaper, La Libre Parole. This curious situation, where the Minister of War would have such vested interest in the finding of the traitor would contribute not only to the false arrest, but to anti-revisionist sentiment.
Another important area was the French counter-intelligence section. The Franco-Prussian war precipitated the creation, in 1872, of a special service in the ministry supposedly meant to deal with "statistics." This Statistical Section was joined administratively to the second bureau of the General Staff and was under the direct control of the chief, or deputy-chief of the General Staff of the Army. In actuality, this "statistics" section was the French intelligence response to its German counterpart, but it would not be until 1887, under the leadership of Commandant Jean Sandherr, that it would really come into its own. (Bredin, 42)
The Statistical Section soon became a product of its director. Sandherr was born in Mulhouse, was an anti-Semite, and a fanatical patriot. The organization he ran was somewhat amateurish but for the most part successful. He put much enthusiasm into the work, as did his other agents, who were never more than a half dozen in number. Among these men, Sandherr cultivated the idea that they were given a sort of divine mission, one which they alone could do right. They included Commandant Albert Cordier, Commandant Hubert Joseph Henry, Captain Jules Lauth, Captain Pierce Matton, and Felix Gribelin. (Bredin, 43-45) Henry, an ardent patriot who shared Sandherr’s anti-Semitism, dominated much of the work, especially after Sandherr’s increased deterioration with creeping paralysis.
The nature of the Statistical Section created the opportunity for a miscarriage of justice like the Dreyfus Affair. Had incompetence, anti-Semitism and unprofessional tendencies not been so pervasive in this organ of counter-intelligence, the true author of the infamous bordereau would have been discovered. Instead, Sandherr and his underlings, urged on by Mercier, were eager to assign blame to the most obvious and vulnerable person they could find who could conceivably have been responsible. At the time, the evidence that they had seemed to be enough to secure an arrest and a trial, but soon it would not be enough, and the call to "nurture" the damning evidence against Dreyfus would be issued. There was little remorse among those involved. Sandherr’s response to any doubts of his guilt proved to be tell-tale: "It’s obvious that you don’t know the Jews. They’re a race without honor or pride. For hundreds of years they’ve done nothing but betray." (de la Gorce, 38)
